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Abstract 
 
Hong Kong’s currency is pegged to the US dollar in a currency board arrangement. In autumn 2003, 
the Hong Kong dollar appreciated from close to 7.80 per US dollar to 7.70, as investors feared that 
the currency board would be abandoned. In the wake of this appreciation, the monetary authorities 
revamped the one-sided currency board mechanism into a symmetric two-sided system with a 
narrow exchange rate band. This paper reviews the characteristics of the new currency board 
arrangement and embeds a theoretical soft edge target zone model typifying many intermediate 
regimes, to explain the notable achievement of speculative peace and credibility since May 2005. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Hong Kong´s currency board stands out among such arrangements around the world as the one with 
the longest history.1 Hong Kong´s currency board was established in 1983 and the Hong Kong 
dollar (HKD) was pegged to the US dollar (USD) at 7.80 to 1. In September 1998, the rate was 
changed to 7.75 to 1. The exchange rate moved gradually from 7.75 back to 7.80 between April 
1999 and August 2000. The HKD is freely convertible and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) is responsible for the peg.  
In the present currency board setup, the note-issuing banks deliver to the HKMA an equivalent 
amount of US dollars (USD) as backing for their HKD note issues. The HKMA in turn issues 
certificates of indebtedness denominated in HKD. Similarly, the banks can obtain USD from the 
HKMA by delivering local currency at the fixed exchange rate. Other banks wishing to exchange 
local currency notes can also purchase (or sell) them against equivalent amounts of USD at the fixed 
exchange rate.2
Contrary to actively managed fixed exchange rate systems, a currency board system is a passive 
“hard-fixed” peg system. Nonetheless, the HKMA does at times intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to defend the peg. In addition, the HKMA influences interbank liquidity and thus short-term 
inter-bank interest rates. Hong Kong´s currency board has survived a number of booms and busts, 
including a massive speculative attack during Asia´s financial crisis of 1997-98. Given the 
speculative outflow of USD, the HKMA sold large amounts of USD in October 1998 to defend the 
peg. Furthermore, the HKMA pursued a defensive interest rate strategy which was partly responsible 
for bringing about a severe recession.3  
In light of the fact that exchange rate regimes have been at the centre of academic debate and have 
been a major concern for policymakers in recent years, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
sheds light on the dynamics of the exchange rate in the period 2001 - 2009 and reviews institutional 
features of Hong Kong´s currency board. Section 3 presents the model and its solution. Analytically, 
the modelling approach lies at the crossroads of the literature on exchange rate target zones 
originated by Krugman (1991) and the literature on currency boards. With the aim of parsimony in 
mind, but also wanting to ensure a fair degree of reality, we extend and generalize the standard 
                                                          
1 Locally, Hong Kong´s currency board system is known as the “linked exchange rate system”. Initially, the 
currency board was adopted as an emergency measure to prevent the HKD from collapsing during a political 
row between China and the United Kingdom in 1983 over the future of the colony. 
2 An in-depth discussion of Hong Kong´s currency board, including documentations on the technical details is 
available at http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/currency/link_ex/index.htm. For a perceptive and thorough 
discussion, see Latter (2007). Most economic policy contributions and discussions on currency board 
arrangements are based on informal analysis devoid of formal economic models. An exception is Chan and 
Chen (2003). 
3 The result of this surprise move was that interbank interest rates jumped and the overnight rate touched 280 
percent. This successfully stemmed the speculative outflow of USD. Overnight rates dropped back to about 5 
percent within a few days. 
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target zone model by introducing perceived uncertainty about the edges following the policy change 
in May 2005. Section 4 concludes and draws some policy implications. 
 
2. Institutional Features of Hong Kong´s Currency Board, 2001 - 2009 
 
Despite the presumed rigidity of the currency board system, the convergence between the exchange 
rate in the interbank market and the fixed rate for currency did not happen in practice. Initially, the 
HKMA therefore introduced a wider exchange rate commitment for reserve banks (weak-side 
Convertibility Undertaking – CU). This was a weak-side commitment in that the HKMA was ready 
to buy unlimited amounts of HKD for USD to prevent a weakening of the currency.4 This weak-side 
commitment is shown by the red line in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Daily HKD Spot Exchange Rate Against USD and Exchange Rate Band 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Since late 2003, speculative pressure for a revaluation of the Chinese Renminbi has grown, with the 
result of large speculative inflows. The HKD appreciated from 7.80 to 7.70 in autumn 2003, fuelling 
speculation that the currency board link to the USD might be abandoned.5 The experience shows 
that a currency board is not a form of magic protection against speculation. Lastly, the link was 
defended with a combination of market interventions, including direct foreign exchange operations 
and manipulation of liquidity and interest rates. Over and above these actions, the currency board 
                                                          
4 In contrast, no strong-side boundary was introduced, i.e. the previous system was asymmetric. While no 
formal strong-side intervention point was introduced, the Subcommittee on Currency Board Operations 
already considered the options in this area in meetings in October 1999 and July 2000 and “agreed that there 
would be scope to review the arrangement again, should the need arise” [HKMA (2000)]. For a review of the 
performance of the currency board arrangement after May 2005, see Genberg et al. (2007). 
5 For the first time, this added a ceiling to the floor by which HKMA had traditionally managed the currency, 
in a move to discourage investors from using the HKD to speculate on RMB appreciation. 
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arrangement was again altered on 18 May 2005 when finally a narrow symmetric target zone of ±0.6 
percent was introduced with a strong-side Convertibility Undertaking (the green line in Figure 1) at 
HKD 7.75/USD. For the first time, this added a ceiling to the floor by which it had traditionally 
managed the currency, in a move to discourage investors from using the HKD to speculate on a 
RMB appreciation. At the same time, the weak-side CU was changed from HKD 7.80/USD to HKD 
7.85/USD. These “refinements” were intended to anchor market expectations and promote a smooth 
functioning of the currency board arrangement. Figure 1 shows that the HKD spot rate stayed close 
to the strong-side CU most of the time after May 2005. The validity of the current arrangement has 
not been called into question by the current financial crisis. 
 
Figure 2:  Daily Movements in HKD Spot Rate and Forward Rates Against USD 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the credibility record of the Hong Kong experiment implemented in 2005. Time 
series for the (on-shore) 1-month and 1-year forward exchange rates of the HKD against the USD 
are shown in Figure 2. This is known as Svensson´s (1992, 1994) 100% credibility test. It rests on 
investigating whether the forward rate lies within the band (credibility holds) or whether the band is 
violated (credibility doesn´t hold). The chart indicates that prior to autumn 2003 the forward market 
expected a depreciation of the HKD (HKD rates were constantly higher than the target rate), which 
never materialized. Since the end of 2003, the forward market has consistently expected – and 
missed - an appreciation of the HKD relative to the USD. The red line for the 1-year forward rate 
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indicates that it was far outside the official band in January 2005 and only unhurriedly moved 
towards the Convertibility Zone afterwards. All in all, the 1-year forward rate of the HKD was 
consistently outside the convertibility zone between October 2005 and the beginning of 2007. This 
indicates that financial market participants were initially sceptical about the ability of the new 
strong-side CU to limit exchange rate fluctuations.6  
 
Figure 3: 1-Year Forward Exchange Rates of HKD and RMB Against USD 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
How can we explain this development? Figure 3 spotlights developments in the 1-year forward 
exchange rate of the HKD versus the non-deliverable 1-year forward exchange rate (NDF) of the 
RMB from 2005 to 2009.7 Until autumn 2006 the 1-year HKD and the appreciating 1-year NDF 
RMB forward rates were parallelly aligned, after which the co-movement disappeared.8 The 
intermittent upward pressure on the HKD forward exchange rate was in part the result of strong 
                                                          
6 If the peg is viewed as irrevocable, the forward premium should be eliminated entirely. As Figure 2 indicates, 
the forward premium varied significantly over time, reflecting major domestic and international events that 
impacted Hong Kong´s current and/or anticipated economic and financial conditions. This raises the question 
of the credibility of the target zone bands, which has been unduly neglected as an important component of the 
target zone literature. Schmukler and Servén (2002) provide a comprehensive characterisation of the currency 
premium in Hong Kong. Their estimates raise the question of whether Hong Kong´s currency board really has 
sufficient credibility to minimise exchange rate risk. 
7 As is the case with standard forward contracts, NDF exchange rates are fixed for a future date. Thus, the 
NDF contract is similar to a regular forward foreign exchange contract, except that at maturity the NDF is 
settled in another currency, typically the USD, because the domestic currency is subject to capital controls, and 
is therefore “non-deliverable”. In contrast to standard deliverable forwards, NDF´s are traded offshore, i.e. 
outside the jurisdiction of the authorities of the corresponding currency. Trading predominantly takes place in 
Hong Kong and Singapore and, to a lesser extent, in London and Tokyo. The offshore markets offer 
international investors an otherwise unavailable hedging tool against local currency exposure. An analysis of 
Asian NDF markets as a whole, together with a discussion of the basic institutional features of the renminbi 
NDF market, is provided by Fung et al. (2004), Ma et al. (2004) and Debelle et al. (2006). Ma et al. (2004) and 
Debelle et al. (2006) discuss the deepening of the Asian NDF markets in recent years. 
8 This point was also raised by Genberg and Hui (2009). 
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demand for HKD to buy shares on Hong Kong´s stock market. An important factor driving this 
demand was the expectation that the Chinese authorities would allow mainland citizens to invest 
directly in Hong Kong. Belatedly, this reform was deferred indefinitely.  
The perceived credibility issues arising from the new arrangement are modelled in the next section 
of the paper. The resulting setup provides a variation of the standard hard edge target zone concept.  
 
3. A Soft Edge Target Zone Model 
 
Below we rigorously study the perceived credibility issues of an emerging band system in a formal 
model. Our procedure can be regarded as a generalisation of Krugman´s (1991) simple target zone 
model of exchange rates. In the standard model, the peg and the hard edge boundaries are credible, 
and market arbitrage mechanisms and interventions take place in whatever amounts are necessary to 
prevent the band from being violated. In contrast, our model develops the notion that the exchange 
rate band can be seen as a partially credible commitment device. 
In the Hong Kong case, two potential risks may have emerged after May 2005. The first was 
uncertainty about whether the HKMA would honour the peg. For the time being, the Hong Kong 
authorities remain markedly committed to maintaining the existing currency board system.9 Though  
Hong Kong´s economy has become more closely integrated with that of mainland China and it may 
eventually make sense to replace the USD with the renminbi (RMB) in the peg, this “endgame” is 
rather unlikely to happen any time soon, owing to China´s closed capital account. This makes it 
technically impossible for Hong Kong to peg its currency to the RMB. In addition, given the almost 
unanimous belief that the RMB will continue to appreciate over the medium term, it makes little 
sense for Hong Kong to fix the HKD to a currency that is expected to rise in value. If the RMB rises 
further, Hong Kong´s economy – particularly the city´s important export sector - will become more 
competitive in the region. Therefore the USD link is unlikely to be abandoned soon. The second 
perceived risk was that the newly introduced symmetric band might be widened in the future.10 In 
the event of a new exchange rate band, the financial markets may not base their expectations on a 
blind faith in the working of the currency board mechanism and the will and commitment of the 
monetary authorities to defend the edges of the band. If the markets can decipher the potential 
                                                          
9 At the end of 2008, Hong Kong´s backing ratio was 109,5%. The backing ratio is defined as the ratio 
between the market value of the backing portfolio and the value of the monetary base. This will make it 
(almost) feasible to defend the preset “Maginot lines” against market pressure. Data are available from the 
HKMA Monthly Statistical Bulletin (http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/public/index.htm). 
10 HKMA would not be the first central bank to do this. For example, in the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), the currencies were initially allowed to fluctuate no more than 2.25 percent above or 
below fixed bilateral rates. The UK joined in 1990 but was forced to leave in 1992 when sterling came under 
speculative pressure. Fluctuation bands were then widened to plus or minus 15 percent in 1993 to avoid 
defending the indefensible. Likewise, Labhard and Wyplosz (1996) have shown that several central banks in 
the ERM have announced wide exchange rate bands while implicitly targeting narrower ones inside. In other 
words, there was a discrepancy between announced (known) and implicit (unknown) bands. 
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fragility of the edges and do the backward induction, a target zone may lose its reputation and 
stabilising power. Next we concentrate on this second case and discuss the question of perceived soft 
edges in a theoretical framework. 
Let us first briefly consider the basic Krugman (1991) framework with perfectly known and credible 
bands to gain a benchmark for future analysis.11 The model starts from the log-linear asset pricing 
equation that expresses the log exchange rate, s, as the sum of the log of the fundamental, f, and its 
own expected change: 
 
(1)  [ ] dtdsEfs λ+= , 
 
where E[⋅] denotes the rational expectations operator, λ > 0, and time subscripts are omitted for 
brevity. The factors affecting the exchange rate are the fundamentals and financial markets’ 
expectations about the future movement of the exchange rate. It is assumed that the log of the 
fundamental follows an arithmetic Brownian motion without drift: 
 
(2)  dWdf σ= , 
 
where σ  is the risk parameter and W denotes a standard Brownian motion. Applying Itô’s lemma to 
the expectations term yields 
 
(3)  2
2
2
2 df
sdfs σλ+= . 
 
Krugman (1991) specified the dynamics of f  between two limits. The lower and upper band limits, 
s  and s , result from the intervention obligations within the target zone arrangement. This gives rise 
to a reflected or regulated Brownian motion.12
The particular solution of equation (1) is as simple as s = f, showing the unregulated exchange rate 
dynamics. The homogeneous solution, , representing the changes in values from the intervention 
of the central bank is  
Hs
                                                          
11 A number of papers have modified and relaxed the assumption of perfectly known bands. Klein (1992), for 
instance, presented a model in which the width of the band is unknown to the public. The dynamics of the 
exchange rate are driven not only by fundamentals but also by expectations with respect to bandwidth. As a 
consequence, the exchange rate will react more sensitively to fundamentals than in Krugman (1991). On the 
other hand, an intervention reveals the true edge of the band. This mechanism stresses the information role of 
interventions. Klein and Lewis (1993) extended the model to the case of stochastic intra-marginal 
interventions. 
12 Some papers have endogenised exchange rate policy by deriving the width of the band as a rational choice 
of an optimising central bank. For example, Cukierman et al. (1994) model the choice of bandwidth as a 
choice between flexibility in responding to external shocks and commitment to less devaluation and inflation. 
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 (4)  , ffH eAeAs ββ −+−= 21
 
where σλβ 2=  and  and  are positive coefficients. The exponential terms  and 
 cause the bending of the exchange rate function and thus generate the target zone 
nonlinearities. Expressing the exchange rate as an explicit function of the fundamental we obtain the 
S-shaped exchange rate function 
1A 2A
feA β1
feA β−2
 
(5)  , ff eAeAfs ββ −+−= 21
 
which is the general solution of the form for exchange rates. The band edges come from the two 
value-matching conditions: 
 
(6)  1 2
f fs f A e A eβ β−= − + , 
 
(7)  1 2
f fs f A e A eβ β−= − + , 
 
where for s  and s are strong and weaker band exchange rates and f  and f are the levels of 
fundamentals as the edges of the bands are approached. The no-expected-arbitrage-profits conditions 
imply the following two smooth-pasting conditions, which require that the exchange rate function is 
flat at the edges: 
 
(8)  1 20 1
f fA e A eβ ββ β −= − − , 
 
(9)  1 20 1
f fA e A eβ ββ β −= − − . 
 
Equations (6) – (9) enable determination of the two constants of integration,  and , which 
completely solves the model.
1A 2A
13 After obtaining f , f ,  and , a S-shaped curve can be 
obtained from equation (5).  
1A 2A
                                                          
13 Advocates of models with endogenous realignment risks argue that a high risk of realignment can reverse 
the S-type effect that the target zone has on the exchange rate [Bertola and Caballero (1992), Bertola and 
Svensson (1993)].  
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In the original Krugman (1991) model, the reduced form relationship between exchange rates and 
fundamentals is driven by the perfectly known and credible bands. Conversely, what happens when 
the relationship is driven not by the band itself but by expectations regarding the band? How can we 
model perceived uncertainty of market participants as to the currency board arrangement and Hong 
Kong´s monetary authorities’ determination to defend the newly introduced symmetric bands? To 
keep the story tractable, the soft edge band is assumed to consist of two components: the announced 
edges s and s , and a normally distributed noise term.14 In normal times, the noise term is small and 
the self-adjusting autopilot function of the currency board system is expected to behave properly, i.e. 
endogenous market forces stabilise the exchange rate without any need for intervention.15 But in 
noisy times, when confidence is fragile, capital inflows may cause a crisis of confidence that sets off 
massive capital flows. In other words, we replace the perfectly known and credible symmetric band 
[ s , s ] by [ ( )2, sN s σ , ( 2, )sN s σ ] and we analyse how the uncertainty as to the band feeds back 
into the dynamics of the exchange rate. The variance  reflects the degree of confidence market 
participants have in the band given the economy´s current and expected fundamentals. 
σ 2s
 To keep the exchange rate within the symmetric band [ ( )2, sN s σ , ( )2, sN s σ ], it is sufficient to 
confine the fundamental process to [ ( )2, sN f σ , ( )2, sN f σ ] at both ends. By taking expectations 
conditional on the information of f , f 2,  and sσ , we obtain the following perceived value-
matching conditions for the soft edge model, as shown in the Appendix: 
  
                                                          
14 Reality is more complicated, as usual. It is possible to assume more complicated sets of assumptions in our 
model, such as private sector expectations on capital inflow shocks and posterior updates based on realisations, 
but we believe that our simple approach is an adequate and tractable representation of the situation. Another 
alternative would be to use a distribution with fatter-than-normal tails, which would imply a more bimodal 
pattern. Yet we stay with our approach, given the disappointing empirical record of structural exchange rate 
models and that our approach does not require imposition of excessive structure. 
15 The stabilising effect of a currency board arrangement is entirely different from a target zone system. A 
currency board issues currency notes with 100 percent foreign reserves backing at a fixed exchange rate. This 
represents a strong commitment to economic discipline. Any holder of paper money therefore rests assured 
that she can exchange her notes for foreign currency at the fixed rate. Since the exchange rate of paper money 
is fixed, so too must be the exchange rate for bank deposits. Any rate differential leads to profitable cash 
arbitrage, which closes the gap. If the prices of the same product in two sub-markets differ from each other, 
one can buy the product in the lower-price sub-market and sell it at a higher price in the other, gaining a profit 
at zero risk. As many market participants would engage in similar arbitrage, the two prices should equalize, 
provided transaction costs are negligible. The second market arbitrage mechanism is interest arbitrage. For 
example, if there is speculation against the currency, funds will flow out of the economy and domestic interest 
rates will rise. This should reverse the outflow and stabilise the exchange rate. Both market arbitrage 
mechanisms can be classified as self-reversing market movements and represent the self-adjusting “autopilot” 
of a currency board arrangement. It is like the honeymoon effect in a fully credible target zone, but it is driven 
by arbitrage discouraging the exchange rate from straying outside of the band. 
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(10)  ( ) ( )
( )
2 2
2 2
2 2
1 2
2 2
1 2
2
1 2
, ,
,
s s
s
f f
s s
f f
f f
E s s E f A e A e f
s f A e A e
s f A e A e e
β β
β βσ β βσ
β σβ β
σ σ−
+ − −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⇒ = − +
⇒ = − −
 
 
(11)  ( ) ( )
( )
2 2
2 2
2 2
1 2
2 2
1 2
2
1 2
, ,
.
s s
s
f f
s s
f f
f f
E s s E f A e A e f
s f A e A e
s f A e A e e
β β
β βσ β βσ
β β β σ
σ σ−
− − −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⇒ = − +
⇒ = − −
 
 
The corresponding smooth-pasting conditions are 
 
(12)  ( ) ( )2 22 21 20 1 s sf fA e A eβ βσ β βσβ β+ −= − − − , 
(13)  ( ) ( )2 22 21 20 1 s sf fA e A eβ βσ β βσβ β+ −= − − − . 
 
Next we study the properties of this model. The key difference between the solution for a fully 
credible hard band and a perceived soft edge band is that the values of  and  are scaled down 
by a factor of 
1A 2A
2 2 2 1seβ σ > . While a unique exchange rate is defined as a function of the fundamentals 
for the traditional (credible) target zone, a family of such curves is defined for the perceived soft 
target zone. The dynamics becomes what we can call a soft edge target zone. Figure 4 portrays the 
features of the exchange rates versus fundamentals of the models for σs = 0.0, σs = 0.005, and σs = 
0.01.16
Several properties of the solution are apparent from Figure 4. First, the resulting dynamics of the 
exchange rate are again S-shaped. In the fully credible target zone solution (σs = 0), the exchange 
rate is stabilised at the edges [ ( )ln 7.75s =  and ( )ln 7.85s = ]. Second, for perceived soft edges 
(σs > 0), the resulting S-shaped curve is a monotonically increasing function of the standard 
deviation. The other way round, the moderating effect is the stronger, the better the reputation of the 
policymaker. Third, while all curves are almost identical near s = ln (7.80), the soft band curves 
become steeper than the hard band curve as the exchange rate approaches the edges. Hence, soft 
edge bands lead to weaker honeymoon effects and wider target zone ranges. 
                                                          
16 We are well aware of the stylised nature of the model, despite our attempts to calibrate with realistic 
parameters. We do not claim empirical accuracy for the model but use it rather for qualitative features and 
predictions. 
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Figure 4: Soft Edge Target Zone Model 
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Note: Benchmark values are σ = 0.03,  ( )ln 7.85s = , ( )ln 7.75s = , and 9.0=λ . 
 
It makes sense to assume that the longer the exchange rate complies with the pre-announced band, 
the more the announcement is believed. As a result, the commitment grows stronger and more 
credible over time. Let us consider this dependence on the history of the exchange rate, by re-writing 
as σ 2s 2 ts e ησ − , where η > 0 denotes the credibility convergence speed.17 In other words, the 
dynamics causing the effective width of the target zone evolve over time as long as sss ≥≥ . By 
modelling the time-varying nature of the variance, we approximate the current configuration in 
Hong Kong which has secured exchange rate stability. 
It is straightforward to verify that by taking expectations we obtain the following equations 
describing the dynamics of the exchange rate in the target zone: 
 
(14)  ( ) 2 2
2 2
1 2
2
1 2
, ,
,
t
s
t f f
s s
ef f
E s s e E f A e A e f e
s f A e A e e
η
η β β
β σβ β
σ σ
−
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⇒ = − −
tη−
 
  
(15)  ( ) 2 2
2 2
1 2
2
1 2
, ,
.
t
s
t f f
s s
f f e
E s s e E f A e A e f e
s f A e A e e
η
η β β
β β β σ
σ σ
−
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⇒ = − −
tη−
                                                          
 
 
The associated smooth pasting conditions are given by 
 
17 Here we can conveniently assume that the time-dependent exogenous variances do not affect the Bellman 
equation (3), as they are exogenous to market participants. 
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(16)  ( ) ( )2 22 21 20 1
t t
s sf e f eA e A e
η ηβ βσ β βσβ β− −+ − −= − − , 
 
(17)  ( ) ( )2 22 21 20 1
t t
s sf e f eA e A e
η ηβ βσ β βσβ β− −+ − −= − − , 
 
where f  and f are again the upper and lower values of the fundamentals corresponding to the 
upper and lower bounds of the target zone, respectively. A numerical solution is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Exchange Rates as a Function of Fundamentals over Time 
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Note: Parameters of the model are η = 4. Curves are drawn for t = 50, t = 100 and t = 250 days. 
 
The situation portrayed in Figure 5 resembles that in Figure 4. The dynamics cause the width of the 
band to be a varying function of time; over time, the central bank gains credibility among market 
participants. 
The type of problem analysed above has room for further interactions between the exchange rate 
dynamics and perceived credibility. So far constant or deterministically declining  values have 
been assumed. To go beyond the previous exercises, we pursue the analysis further by augmenting 
the target zone framework with a bivariate Markov-switching model.
σ 2s
18 In other words, we model the 
vulnerability of target zone regimes to perceived future speculative attacks and possible self-
                                                          
18 An interesting alternative to our modelling approach with oscillating band widths over time has recently 
been presented by Dibeh (2006). In his modelling approach, the periodic motion is forced by a sinusoidal 
function.  
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fulfilling equilibria.19 The implications of such regime-dependence on the target zone dynamics has 
not been investigated yet.  
How do we introduce such dynamics into the target zone model? To make the perceived nonlinear 
swings in exchange rate pressure tractable, a stochastic process for  must be specified. We 
assume that two different regimes for  with  >  characterised by either episodes of 
exchange rate stability (i = 0) or periods of turbulence (i = 1) exist. The process is subject to discrete 
(sporadic) regime shifts governed by a two-regime Markov process with constant transition 
probabilities.
σ 2s
σ 2si σ 21s σ 20s
20 Formally, the probability of being in each state is determined by the transition 
equation   
 
(18) prob[S1t = 1|S1,t-1 = 1] = 1- φ ,  prob[S0t = 0|S0,t-1 = 0] = 1-θ . 
 
The simple and elegant structure of the Markov-switching framework makes it possible to derive 
simple and elegant results. The altered value-matching conditions for both states are as follows: 
 
(19)  ( ) ( )2 20 0 0 20 0 10 20 1 0 ,sf fs f A e A e e s sβ β β σ θ−= − − + −  
 
(20)  ( ) ( )2 20 0 0 2 1 00 0 10 20 sf fs f A e A e e s sβ β β σ θ−= − − + − ; 
 
(21)  ( ) ( )2 211 1 21 1 11 21 0 1 ,sf fs f A e A e e s sβ σβ β φ−= − − + −  
 
(22)  ( ) ( )2 21 1 2 0 11 1 11 21 sf fs f A e A e e s sβ β β σ φ−= − − + − , 
 
where 0s  and 1s  and 0s  and 1s  are the upper and lower exchanges rate bands, respectively. 0f , 0f , 
1f  and f 1  are the corresponding fundamental thresholds for both bands in regime 0 and regime 1, 
and , ,   and  are the constant terms for both regimes.  10A 20A 11A 21A
                                                          
19 Evidence for repetitive pressure on financial markets leading to a distinct cyclical motion and a new wave of 
exchange rate speculation has been provided by Westerhoff and Reitz (2003). They demonstrate that in the 
presence of chartists which use trends for trading in foreign exchange markets, currencies deviate from their 
fundamental value and follow a distinct cyclical behaviour. Furthermore, the focus upon market expectations 
implies that our modelling approach stands in the tradition of the second-generation currency crisis model 
literature.  
20 Hamilton (1990), Engel (1994), and Cheung and Erlandsson (2005) have popularized the Markov-switching 
toolkit in exchange rate economics by showing that the Markov switching model is a relevant statistical 
alternative to the classical martingale model for exchange rates. 
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Irrespective of the expectations of market participants, the central bank acts on the assumption of 
given thresholds, i.e. s = 0s = 1s  and s = 0s = 1s . In other words, the central bank tries to avoid the 
credibility cost of giving up the exchange rate. Hence, also the thresholds for the fundamental are the 
same for both regimes: f = 0f = 1f   and f = 0f = 1f . Given this assumption the solution can be 
written as 
 
(23)  ( ) 2 20 210 20 sf fs f A e A e eβ σβ β−= − − , 
 
(24)  ( ) 2 20 210 20 sf fs f A e A e eβ β β σ−= − − , 
 
(25)  ( ) 2 21 211 21 sf fs f A e A e eβ σβ β−= − − , 
 
(26)  ( ) 2 21 211 21 sf fs f A e A e eβ β β σ−= − − . 
 
After some simple calculations we get the regime-dependent dynamics of the exchange rate in the 
target zone 
 
(27)  ( ) ( )0 10 20 1f fs f A e A e s sβ β θ−= − − + − 0 , 
 
(28)  ( ) ( )1 11 21 0f fs f A e A e s sβ β φ−= − − + − 1 . 
 
Finally, rearranging yields the following regime-dependent S-shaped functions: 
 
(29) ( ) ( ) (0 10 20 11 21 10 201f f f f f fs f A e A e A e A e A e A eβ β β β β β )θθ φ− − −⎡ ⎤= − − − − − −⎣ ⎦+ + , 
 
(30)  ( ) ( ) (1 11 21 10 20 11 211f f f f f fs f A e A e A e A e A e A eβ β β β β β )φθ φ− − −⎡ ⎤= − − − − − −⎣ ⎦+ + . 
 
The last terms of the right-hand sides of equations (29) and (30) are precisely the market 
participants’ expectations of future regime changes.  
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Figure 6 shows representations of the regime-dependent family of S-curves. The plots are generated 
by numerical solution of the differential equation system for various times t. The parameters are θ = 
0.2 and φ = 0.67, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6: The Soft Edge Band Model With and Without Markov-Switching 
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Note: The dotted (solid) lines represent the dynamics of the exchange rate without (with) regime switching.   
 
Three interesting results emerge. First, it is notable that the target zone remains a stabilising 
instrument even under regime-switching expectations as evidenced by the S-shaped dynamics. 
Second, the story is more subtle than has been acknowledged so far. Figure 6 indicates that in the 
Markovian version of the model the perceived width of the band oscillates. An intuitive explanation 
is the following. In the low-volatility regime 0, the expectation that a future regime change is more 
likely in a high-volatility regime explains why the perceived target zone range is increasing in 
comparison with the baseline model in Figure 4. This is interesting in as far as the central bank is 
assumed to maintain the band. Thus, perceived possible regime switches and speculative attacks 
may put the central bank under strain. Third, in the high-volatility regime 1 the perceived width of 
the band is decreasing in comparison with the baseline model in Figure 4. This moderating effect 
results from the fact that the system will switch back to the low-volatility regime in the future. As 
seen by market participants, this makes a widening of the bands less likely. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Over the last decade, central banks have implemented new breeds of target zone exchange rate 
regimes. In Hong Kong, a symmetric band forming upper and lower limits for HKD fluctuations 
around the central parity was adopted in May 2005, as an integral part of the currency board regime. 
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An interesting feature of Hong Kong´s currency board arrangement is the important achievement of 
speculative peace and credibility after the turbulent year 2003.21 Thus, the formal shift to a very 
narrow target zone of ±0.6 percent in May 2005 has so far helped in ending, mitigating, and 
preventing excessive speculative pressure.22  
On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Hong Kong´s return to China, Time (2007) magazine ran 
a cover story on Hong Kong entitled “Sunshine with Clouds, 1997 - 2007”. In close analogy to the 
title, we summarise the recent performance of the HKD – USD peg as “Mostly Sunshine with 
Occasional Clouds, 2005 – 2009”. Going from specifics to generalisations, one can perhaps now 
conclude that narrow bands may experience an unanticipated comeback in conjunction with 
currency board arrangements.23
This experience is diametrically opposed to the ERM experience in the 1990s. Speculative attacks 
on the French Franc led to the so-called Brussels Compromise in August 1993, which led to much 
wider fluctuation bands of ±15 percent (“soft buffers”). By dropping the commitment to keep the 
exchange rate within a narrow band, ERM central banks have thwarted one-way bets and speculative 
spurts [Batolini and Prati (1993, 1997) and Labhard and Wyplosz (1996)].24  
For our modelling framework we have demonstrated that a narrow target zone may remain a 
stabilising instrument even under noisy expectations. Clearly, this sort of analysis is only a first step. 
Nevertheless, the analysis may lead to enhanced understanding of the great resilience to speculative 
pressure of Hong Kong´s tight ±0.6 percent target zone since May 2005. The modelling work may 
also shed a new light on the economics of target zone regimes.25
                                                          
21 However, in October 2007 strong upward pressure on the HKD put the future of the currency board again in 
the spotlight, and HKMA was forced to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to prevent the rate from 
breaching the narrow band. This represented the first such intervention by the HKMA in more than two years. 
22 Cautionary note: the current stability may be coincidental and caused by the current undervaluation of the 
HKD. In spring 2009 the HKD turned out to be 52 percent undervalued by the Economist Big Max burger 
gauge. The Big Max index is a light-hearted PPP measure of currencies (see The Economist, 18 July 2009, p. 
66). 
23 One should, however, qualify this statement by saying that according to the results for the augmented 
Markov-switching version of the target zone model in Figure 6, the exchange rate may still be vulnerable to 
future speculative attacks. 
24 Actually, the ERM policy approach since August 1993 may be interpreted as a managed-float regime in 
which central banks had intervened with increasing intensity as the exchange rates departed from central 
parities, but without commitment to an explicit narrow band.   
25 Whereas this paper focuses on exchange rate dynamics, other aspects, such as optimal band width are left to 
future research. Some papers have endogenised exchange rate policy by deriving the width of the band as a 
rational choice of an optimising central bank. For example, Cukierman et al. (1994) model the choice of  band 
width as a choice between flexibility in responding to external shocks and commitment to less devaluation and 
inflation. 
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Appendix: Derivation of Equations (10) and (11) 
 
Despite its conceptual simplicity, the model is rather tedious to solve. Below we give the details of 
the solution. The derivation of (10) and (11) can be explained as follows. Taking expectations of 
equation (5) with ( 2, )sN f σ , we obtain 
 
(A1) ( ) ( )
2
222
1 22
1,
2
s
f f
f f
s
s
E s s s f A e A e e dfσβ βσ πσ
−−∞ −
−∞
⎡ ⎤ = = + − +⎣ ⎦ ∫ . 
 
Removing all constant parameters from the integral yields 
 
(A2) 
( ) ( )2 2
2 221 2
2 22 2
s s
f f f f
f f
s s
A As f e e df e e dfσ σβ βπσ πσ
− −− −∞ ∞ −
−∞ −∞= − +∫ ∫ . 
 
The next step is to obtain expressions for the integrals on the right-hand side of (A2). By expanding 
( 2)f f−  and collecting terms related to f, the first integral is given by 
 
(A3) 
( )2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2 21 1
2 22 2
s
s s
f f f ff f f
f
s s
A Ae e df e df
βσ
σ σβ
πσ πσ
− − + −− −∞ ∞
−∞ −∞=∫ ∫ .  
 
Completing a square of ( )( )22sf f βσ− +  gives 
 
(A4) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 22 2 2 2 2
2
2 22 2 2 4 2
22 2
2
21
2
2
22 21
12 2
2
1 .
2 2
s s s
s
s s s s
ss s
f f f f f f
s
f f f f f
f
s s
A e df
A e df A e e
βσ βσ βσ
σ
βσ βσ β σ βσ
β βσσ σ
πσ
πσ πσ
− + + + − + +−∞
−∞
− + − + − +
− −∞ ∞+
−∞ −∞= =
∫
∫ ∫ df
 
 
Note that the integral 
( )( )22
22
2
1
2
s
s
f f
s
e
βσ
σ
πσ
− +
−∞
−∞∫ df  is the expectation of normal distribution with 
mean 2sf βσ+  and variance 2sσ , and equals one. Thus the preceding expression simplifies to 
 
(A5) 
( ) ( )
2
22 221
122
ss
f f
ff
s
A e e df A eβ βσσβπσ
−−∞ +−
−∞ =∫ . 
 
Based on the same logic, it is straightforward to demonstrate that the second integral is of the form 
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(A6) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 22 2 2 2 2
2
22 2 2 4
2
22
2 2
2 2
2 22 2
2 2
2
22
2
2
22
2
2 2
2 22
2 2
2
2
1
2
s
s s
s s s
s
s s s
s
s
s s
f f f ff f f
f
s s
f v f f f f
s
f f f
s
f f
f
s
A Ae e df e df
A e df
A e df
A e e df A
βσ
σ σβ
βσ βσ βσ
σ
βσ βσ β σ
σ
βσ
β βσ σ
πσ πσ
πσ
πσ
πσ
− − + +− −∞ ∞−
−∞ −∞
− − + − − − +−∞
−∞
− − − − +
−∞
−∞
− −
−∞− −
−∞
= −
=
=
= =
∫ ∫
∫
∫
∫ ( )2 2sfe β βσ− −
 
 
After plugging in (A5) - (A6) and rearranging, we finally obtain equation (10) in the text: 
 
(A7) ( ) ( )2 22 22 1 2, s sf fsE s s s f A e A eβ βσ β βσσ + − −⎡ ⎤ = = − +⎣ ⎦  
 
In the same vein, equation (11) can be obtained. Taking expectations of equation (11) in the text 
with ( 2, )sN f σ  yields  
 
(A8) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
2 2
2 2
22
1 2
21 2
2 2
,
2 2
s
s s
f f
f f
s
f f f f
f f
s s
E s s s f A e A e e df
A Af e e df e e df
σβ β
σ σβ β
σ
πσ πσ
−−∞ −
−∞
− −− −∞ ∞ −
−∞ −∞
⎡ ⎤ = = + − +⎣ ⎦
= − +
∫
∫ ∫
. 
 
Following the above simplifying procedure, we obtain 
 
 (A9) ( ) ( )2 22 21 2s sf fs f A e A eβ βσ β βσ+ − −= − + , 
 
which concludes the derivation. 
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